islibaodong/dsh-login

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Adds a login page, user accounts, and per-user conversation isolation to the DeepSeek Harness Web GUI: every visit requires sign-in, ordinary users cannot see each other's conversations, and an admin manages all accounts from inside the GUI.

Login page	User management (设置 → 用户管理)

Released: @islibaodong/dsh-login@0.3.5 (git tag v0.3.5; published on npm — latest = 0.3.5). Verified against DSH 0.2.1-rc.2 (2026-10-18; full suite 20 files / 256 tests green on the published rc.2 builds). Option A: upstream reworked the /api transport — dsh-login no longer takes it over (the connection row is re-enabled) and answers 401 on the shared /api bridge without a session (apiBridgeAuth, default on). New in 0.3.5: tracking DSH 0.2.1-rc.2 — three upstream releases landed since alpha.4 (alpha.5 → rc.1 → rc.2; 49 commits) and the entire adapter surface is source-unchanged: every dsh-login integration point (host/webserver, client/connection, settings, host/frontend-static, client/modules boot graph, client/runtime/ui-slots, the /api controllers, web-app, app-boot) changed only in package.json, and the /api controllers have zero src diff — so the wire method registry (and USER_ALLOWED/ADMIN_ONLY_*) needed no edits. The harness also re-released its vendored packages at stable versions (PR #6388: cordis 4.0.5, schemastery 3.18.5, include 1.0.10, loader 1.0.6, …), so 0.3.5 pins those instead of the alphas; the new rc.2 packages (web-deepseek-api, ui-deepseek-model-label-1017, ui-settings-web-search) are agent-side/UI-only and add no wire surface. 0.3.4: tracking DSH 0.2.1-alpha.4 — upstream added the plugin market (packages/boot/plugin-market, typert namespace pluginMarket: browse configured market indexes and install their bundles), which dsh-login gates admin-only across all three layers (wire guard, /api/pluginMarket/* two-segment deny with quiet read probes, capability advertisement) — setIndexes reconfigures the instance-wide index list, so it is never user-reachable; the client boot graph now carries a release stamp that dsh-login's uiRoleGate preserves byte-identical through filtering. 0.3.3: tracking DSH 0.2.1-alpha.3 — upstream shipped its first native RBAC substrate (packages/api/remote-access: per-Peer policies for non-owner connections — dsh-login users remain owner principals, so dsh-login's own walls keep enforcing; still no native user accounts), the terminal became a bidirectional terminal.attach stream (the removed terminal.follow/terminal.write/terminal.resize methods dropped from the allow-list), and the new harness-dev-context web-app row injects webApp, which dsh-login now provides itself alongside its web-runtime takeover. 0.3.2: tracking DSH 0.2.1-alpha.2 — upstream added TLS (HTTPS) to the webserver, moved the connection trust authorities to the new webStartup service, and retired the webRuntime service upstream (dsh-login's takeOverWebRuntime re-provide is now compat-only) — the dsh web: URL line and DSH_WEB_URL now spell the actual bind address, matching upstream. 0.3.1: the bridge wall enforces the USER_ALLOWED method allow-list for ordinary users, narrows their session.list/session.search/workspace.list responses to owned sessions, keeps the ownership sidecar warm (session/workspace/fork recording + per-user default-workspace provisioning), and ships a deployment glue (composeDshLoginGuard + docs/compose-guard.md) for composing the REMOTE-layer isolation guard over the native typertGateway — the two-browser sign-off of that composition remains a deployment-side acceptance step. 0.3.0 added per-role whole-UI gating (uiRoleGate, default on) — ordinary users never mount the admin-only client bundles (the boot-graph lever documented below). See Current status → and docs/verify-option-A.md.

Adaptation history (all versions below are published on npm): 0.2.1 → DSH 0.1.6-alpha.1 (sidebar terminal, unarchive sessions); 0.2.2 → 0.1.6-alpha.2 (the apiBridgeAuth wall on the shared /api bridge, the document-preview workspaceFiles/officeToPdf user surface, the native pluginManager namespace admin-only); 0.2.3 → 0.1.7-alpha.2 (settings seam re-home, the new account namespace admin-only, the job controller user surface, session pinning); 0.2.4 → the DSH #4587 settings-error fix; 0.2.5 → DSH 0.2.0-rc.2 (peer retarget onto the 0.2.0 tuple line — the surface verified source-compatible, no code change); 0.2.6 → the issue #3 fix (a fresh device's first page load after login hit the core BrowserAuth's plain-text 401 — the gateway now bounces once through the ?token= exchange so the core mints its browser cookie); 0.2.7 → DSH 0.2.1-alpha.1 (peer retarget onto the 0.2.1 tuple line + the retired @deepseek-ai/dsh-invariants references removed — no source change); 0.3.0 → the per-role whole-UI gate (uiRoleGate) implemented on the boot-graph lever (still tracking DSH 0.2.1-alpha.1); 0.3.1 → the shared-/api bridge wall gains per-user enforcement (the USER_ALLOWED method gate, owned-only session.list/session.search/workspace.list narrowing, ownership recording including admin record-only, default-workspace provisioning wiring) plus the composeDshLoginGuard deployment glue (no upstream change — still 0.2.1-alpha.1); 0.3.2 → DSH 0.2.1-alpha.2 (devDep retarget — the peer tuple already admitted alpha.2 — plus the dsh web: URL line/DSH_WEB_URL now spelling the actual bind address; upstream retired its webRuntime service, so dsh-login's takeover is compat-only, and upstream added TLS); 0.3.3 → DSH 0.2.1-alpha.3 (devDep retarget onto the re-published vendor alphas — peers unchanged; webApp provided so the new harness-dev-context row injects; allow-list updated for the alpha.3 wire surface: terminal.attach replaces follow/write/resize, remoteAccess.follow admitted; upstream's first RBAC substrate evaluated); 0.3.4 → DSH 0.2.1-alpha.4 (devDep retarget — the peer tuples already admitted alpha.4; the new pluginMarket namespace — the plugin market's instance-wide index configuration — gated admin-only across all three layers; the uiRoleGate boot-graph filter regression-tested to preserve the new release graph field); 0.3.5 → DSH 0.2.1-rc.2 (devDep retarget onto the rc.2 tuple line plus the stable vendor re-release — peers unchanged, the alpha-peer ranges admit stable; the whole adapter surface verified source-unchanged, /api controllers zero diff — no code change; the new web-deepseek-api/ui-deepseek-model-label-1017/ui-settings-web-search packages add no wire surface; multi-user/RBAC re-verified, still none native). 0.1.7-rc.1 / rc.2 were verified compatible without a release — details in docs/adapt-dsh-0.1.7-rc.1.md / docs/adapt-dsh-0.1.7-rc.2.md / docs/adapt-dsh-0.2.0-rc.2.md. Upstream still has no native multi-user accounts and no per-role UI gating, but 0.2.1-alpha.3 shipped the first native RBAC substrate for non-owner connections (packages/api/remote-access + multi-principal Peers; re-evaluated 2026-10-15 — see below).

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Current status — released (option A)

@islibaodong/dsh-login@0.3.5 is released (git tag v0.3.5; published on npm — latest = 0.3.5). The option-A adaptation for DSH ≥ 0.1.5-alpha.1 is complete and tracks upstream through 0.2.1-rc.2 (verified 2026-10-18): dsh-login no longer takes over /api — the native connection + api-remotes/api-gateway stack owns the transport — and composes the login wall (fallback seat), the apiBridgeAuth wall on the shared /api bridge, and capability discovery on top of it. 0.3.0 ships the per-role whole-UI gate: with uiRoleGate: true (default) the gateway filters the window.__DSH_BOOT__ graph for ordinary users so admin-only client bundles never mount (src/ui-gate.ts; deny-list = ADMIN_ONLY_UI_PLUGINS; admins and uiRoleGate:false see the full graph; fail-open on any unexpected shape). The bridge wall adds (0.3.1) the per-user method gate (USER_ALLOWED), owned-only response narrowing for session.list/session.search/workspace.list, ownership recording (including admin-created resources, record-only), and per-user default-workspace provisioning. 0.3.2 mirrored upstream's bind-address URL line (upstream's webRuntime retirement made the takeover compat-only). 0.3.3 retargeted the devDeps to 0.2.1-alpha.3 and provided webApp for the new harness-dev-context row. 0.3.4 retargets the devDeps to 0.2.1-alpha.4 (peers already admitted it) and keeps the walls current with the new wire surface: alpha.4's plugin market (packages/boot/plugin-market, typert namespace pluginMarket — listIndexes/setIndexes/search over the instance-wide market index list) is gated admin-only across all three layers (src/remote-guard.ts ADMIN_ONLY_NAMESPACES, src/capabilities.ts two-segment deny + admin advertisement + quiet read probes for listIndexes/search, setIndexes staying a loud 403), and the boot graph's new release stamp (WebBootRelease {version, commit?} — alpha.4's client reload gating) is preserved byte-identical through the uiRoleGate filter with a regression test. 0.3.5 retargets the devDeps to 0.2.1-rc.2 (peers already admitted it, and the stable vendor re-release) — the adapter surface came out source-unchanged (every integration point changed only in package.json; the /api controllers have zero src diff), so the walls needed no edits; the rc.2 additions (web-deepseek-api, ui-deepseek-model-label-1017, ui-settings-web-search) add no wire surface. The full suite is 20 files / 256 tests green against the published 0.2.1-rc.2 builds, including the real-composition tests on booted servers. Deliberately NOT yet boot-verified (needs a real dsh web boot to confirm): the per-user isolation guard composed over the native typertGateway via the shipped deployment glue (docs/compose-guard.md) and the two-browser isolation sign-off (see docs/verify-option-A.md §B). See docs/adapt-dsh-0.2.1-rc.2.md for this release's full surface analysis and docs/adapt-dsh-0.1.5.md for the original status matrix.

Delivered and working

• Login wall + multi-account user management (设置 → 用户管理).
• Capability discovery (GET /api/auth/capabilities, session-authenticated) and quiet read-denials (204 for a no-permission read probe, 403 for writes; toggle via quietDenials), so ordinary-user browsers stop getting "forbidden" walls and retry storms.
• dsh-login's own settings contribution is already per-user: admins see 设置 → 用户管理, ordinary users see 账户 (identity + logout); ordinary users never call the admin API.
• Per-user isolation guard ships as a composition primitive (option A). Under DSH ≥ 0.1.5 the native connection/api-gateway owns /api, so dsh-login's isolation is a REMOTE-layer guard — wrapRemoteGateway + createRemoteIsolation, exported from this package's host bundle and unit/integration-tested (including ownership scoping and admin passthrough). The wrapper forwards every non-dispatch gateway member unchanged (e.g. DSH 0.2.0-rc.2's required hasLiveClient()), so composing it stays interface-complete. connection ownership + per-user default workspace are re-established on the native stack. The guard must be composed over the native typertGateway row at boot (a deployment decision, not a runtime hot-swap — re-providing typertGateway would be a duplicate-service error); dsh-login ships ready-made glue for that composition — the ownership sidecar is published as the dshLoginOwnership service and composeDshLoginGuard(ctx, gateway) wraps a native gateway in one call (see docs/compose-guard.md for a complete row module and acceptance checklist). The two-browser behavior sign-off remains a deployment-side step. See docs/verify-option-A.md §B.
• Tracks upstream 0.1.5-alpha.1 → 0.2.1-rc.2. Each upstream release's user-facing wire surface joins the ordinary allow-list as it lands (sidebar terminal.*, workspace.unarchiveSession/pinSession/unpinSession, the read-only workspaceFiles/officeToPdf document preview, the job controller; 0.2.0 added no new wire methods or namespaces; 0.2.1 added the claudeCodeMods namespace — agent-mod band UI above the prompt — which rides the default deny, no user surface yet; 0.2.1-alpha.2 added none; 0.2.1-alpha.3 replaced the terminal trio with the terminal.attach stream and admitted remoteAccess.follow — the native remote-access snapshot stream that answers with only the caller's own grants; 0.2.1-alpha.4 added the pluginMarket namespace — admin-only wholesale, see below; 0.2.1-rc.2 added no wire methods or namespaces at all — the entire adapter surface is source-unchanged and the new rc.2 bundles (web-deepseek-api, ui-deepseek-model-label-1017, ui-settings-web-search) are agent-side or UI-only), while new admin-only namespaces (pluginManager + pluginRegistryProbe, the account DeepSeek-Platform controller — the one process-wide upstream grant, including 0.1.7-rc.2's watchExpiry expiry stream, and 0.2.1-alpha.4's pluginMarket) are denied wholesale. Since DSH 0.1.7-rc.1 the host runs a boot-time plugin-compatibility admission against peer ranges — dsh-login's ranges admit the current runtime (0.2.7 added the 0.2.1 branch), and the check is fail-open (stderr report only), so after any DSH upgrade verify the login page actually appears. 0.3.0 additionally ships uiRoleGate — the per-role whole-UI boot-graph filter (see below).

Per-role control of the whole UI — SHIPPED in 0.3.0 (uiRoleGate)

• dsh-login 0.3.0 implements the whole-UI gate in-plugin (no upstream change needed). The gateway renders the index itself, and the client module roster travels in that HTML as window.__DSH_BOOT__; the page then activates exactly that roster (ClientEntries.reconcile() creates one entry per manifest row and removes any bundle absent from it). For an ordinary (non-admin) session with uiRoleGate: true (the default), the gateway rewrites the boot graph before serving the index: entries in the ADMIN_ONLY_UI_PLUGINS deny-list are dropped, their batches patched or removed, and the shell never mounts them. Presentation-only — the /api allow-list (apiBridgeAuth + USER_ALLOWED) remains the security boundary. Admins get the unfiltered graph; any unexpected shape fails open (original HTML served). See docs/adapt-dsh-0.2.1-alpha.1.md §6.
• What the gate does NOT do: per-package granularity only — hiding one slot/section inside an allowed bundle (e.g. DSH's settings panel, whose SettingsRoot → useSections list carries no identity dimension) stays out of scope. DSH's WebServer route priority is exact-beats-prefix with no pre-routing hook, so a plugin that self-registers exact routes (e.g. @linxin666/dsh-pet serving /api/pet/pets) cannot be intercepted per user by dsh-login either.
• Upstream still ships no per-identity UI gate: the client boot/activation layer and ui-slots carry no role/permission/isAdmin concept (re-verified 2026-10-18 at 0.2.1-rc.2; isAdmin/isAllowed greps return zero hits under packages/client — and note that ~238 files still match a raw role grep because of DOM role="…" accessibility attributes, not account roles). 0.2.1-alpha.3's remote-access RBAC gates non-owner Peer connections server-side (per-resource decide() + snapshot injection), not the client UI roster — an entirely different axis from this boot-graph gate; 0.2.1-alpha.4 changed nothing here (its release graph field is release-identity plumbing for client reload gating, not a permission axis, and dsh-login's gate preserves it); 0.2.1-rc.2 re-verified unchanged.

Upstream multi-user / RBAC evaluation (first at 0.2.1-alpha.3, 2026-10-15; re-verified 0.2.1-alpha.4, 2026-10-16, and 0.2.1-rc.2, 2026-10-18)

• No native user accounts — no user store, no login, no identity UI (the recurring multi.?user|multiuser|role.?based|\brbac\b grep produced its first hit ever: packages/api/remote-access/README.md; the same single hit at 0.2.1-rc.2, 2026-10-18). dsh-login remains the account/authn layer.
• What 0.2.1-alpha.3 actually added: a native authorize-only RBAC engine for non-owner Peers (packages/api/remote-access: Principal/PrincipalMap — owner is the only kind today, merge-extensible — plus registerPolicy/decide per resource, an owner baseline injected as the __DSH_REMOTE_ACCESS__ global, and the always-allowed remoteAccess.follow snapshot stream) and the multi-principal connection machinery behind it (createPeer/admitConnection, v2 API cookies {version:2, id: PeerId}, the GET /connect token exchange, socket-ownership 409). This is the substrate a future native per-resource/whole-UI permission system would build on — nothing consumes it for dsh-login's use case yet.
• Why it does not change dsh-login's security model: dsh-login users reach the native stack as owner principals (the browser cookie mints browserPeer {kind:'owner'}), and remote-access never gates owners — dsh-login's login wall, USER_ALLOWED bridge wall, remote guard, and uiRoleGate remain the actual multi-user boundary. Known substrate caveats dsh-login's own scrubbing already covers: undeclared resources are UNCHECKED, api-session added entries leak parentSessionId, the ready frame exposes full host/home.
• Future option (documented, not integrated): if dsh-login ever mints non-owner principals, it could register remote-access policies per dsh-login role to get native per-resource enforcement for free.

Still wanted from upstream: per-identity slot/section filtering (for sub-package granularity inside an allowed bundle) and a host-side per-user plugin activation gate. Neither exists at 0.2.1-rc.2 (the remote-access substrate is per-resource connection policy, not UI activation; 0.2.1-alpha.4 added the admin-only plugin market and the release boot-graph stamp — release-identity plumbing, not a permission axis; rc.2 added nothing here); the 0.3.0 boot-graph gate covers whole packages only.

The problem it solves

The DSH Web GUI ships with no login — it assumes a single user on localhost. The moment you bind it to 0.0.0.0 (phone access, LAN sharing, a small team), anyone on that network can open your GUI: read every conversation, burn your configured model API keys, even change host settings.

dsh-login turns that exposure into a multi-user deployment:

• 🔐 Login wall — pages, static assets, SPA routes, the API, and WebSockets all require a valid session; unauthenticated visitors are redirected to /login
• 👥 Multiple accounts — the first visit creates the administrator account; further users are added by an admin right inside the GUI, no CLI needed
• 🙈 Conversation isolation — ordinary users see and act on their own conversations only (including their subagents/forks); the bridge wall denies non-whitelisted methods and narrows session.list/session.search/workspace.list responses to owned sessions, and the composed REMOTE-layer guard scopes dispatches by ownership; other users' sessions, messages, and workspaces are invisible; credentials, host settings, and other admin domains are forbidden wholesale
• 🛠 User management — 设置 → 用户管理: last-login time, online session count, reset password, disable, remove; disabling/removing/password-changes immediately revoke that user's live sessions
• 👑 Admin exception — the admin is not isolated: all sessions visible, full configuration access
• 🚪 Logout — every user gets a logout entry in their settings panel
• 🌐 Remote access friendly — reach the GUI through frp/隧道/tunnels or a LAN IP without hand-editing trustedHosts: the /api host-trust fence uses a live set (LAN literals + trustedHosts + auto-learned hosts), and any successful login learns its Host into a persisted whitelist you can manage in 设置 → 用户管理

Quick start

No environment variables, no config edits — three steps:

# 1. Install (web is the profile that boots the Web GUI)
dsh plugin --profile web add github:islibaodong/dsh-login

2. Initialize: restart dsh web and open the GUI — the first visit shows a one-time "create administrator account" page; pick a username and password
3. Add users: sign in as admin → 设置 → 用户管理 → 新建用户

Uninstall:

dsh plugin --profile web remove @islibaodong/dsh-login

Why --profile web? DSH installs plugins per profile directory ($DSH_HOME/profiles/<name>); web is the profile that boots the Web GUI. Use your profile's name if you run a custom one.

FAQ

• Do I have to log in again after restarting DSH? No — login sessions are persisted to <dataDir>/sessions.json (0o600), so an existing cookie keeps working across a process restart (the cookie otherwise lasts 7 days by default). Only an actual log-out, password change, user removal, or TTL expiry invalidates it.
• What can an ordinary user do? Use the chat normally: create/open/continue their own sessions, run subagents, manage their own workspace content. Everything else (other people's sessions, credentials, plugins/presets/host settings, model-key management) is refused.
• Upgrading from the old single-password version? The old single password no longer logs anyone in; the first visit after upgrading bootstraps a fresh administrator account (details in the migration note below).

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Technical details

For contributors, security reviewers, and troubleshooting. You don't need any of this to use the plugin.

What installation does

dsh plugin add reads this package's declared cordis.patch.yml (a bundle patch) and automatically:

• mounts the dsh-login plugin row (config defaults are sensible; distIndex resolves the frontend dist automatically)
• disables the web-runtime row (where dsh-web-app mounts the frontend-static fallback); dsh-login takes over the fallback seat and re-provides the webRuntime service (LAN trust for the /api fence + the DSH_WEB_URL variable)
• keeps the shipped connection row enabled (option A, DSH ≥ 0.1.5): dsh-client-connection owns the /api carrier and browser-session auth; dsh-login composes its login wall (fallback seat) + per-user isolation primitive on top. It ships its own browser bundle dist/client.js for the settings panel only.

Manual installation (alternative)

If you prefer managing the patch file yourself, add these rows to your profile's cordis.patch.yml:

- insert:
    - id: dsh-login
      name: '@islibaodong/dsh-login'
      config:
        password: DSH_LOGIN_PASSWORD   # credential ref name; namespaces the user store (<name>_USERS)
        distIndex: ''                  # empty resolves the frontend dist automatically
        dataDir: ''                    # empty resolves to <DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login (ownership index)
        sessionTtl: 604800             # 7 days (default)
        autoTrustHosts: true          # learn the Host of any successful login into the /api whitelist
        enabled: true                 # set false to disable without uninstalling
        defaultWorkspace: true        # auto-provision a per-user default workspace on first /api access (on by default; toggleable live in 设置-用户管理)
        workspaceRoot: ''             # default-workspace sandbox root; empty => <DSH_HOME>/workspaces
        apiBridgeAuth: true           # require the dsh_session cookie on the shared /api bridge (DSH >= 0.1.6-alpha.2, on by default)

# IMPORTANT: dsh-login takes over the fallback seat, so the web-runtime row
# (which mounts frontend-static) must be disabled. dsh-login re-provides the
# webRuntime service, so the rest of the composition is unaffected.
- id: web-runtime
  disabled: true

The shipped connection row (dsh-client-connection) stays enabled in option A — it owns /api and the browser-session auth. Do not disable it. dsh-login ships a ready-made deployment glue for per-user isolation (see docs/compose-guard.md): fork your typertGateway row and wrap the native gateway with composeDshLoginGuard at boot — dsh-login publishes its ownership sidecar as the dshLoginOwnership service for exactly that composition.

Note: new rows must live under - insert: — a bare top-level row is treated as an override of an existing row and is a silent no-op for new ids; and the disable key is disabled (not disable).

First-time setup flow

1. First visit (no users yet) -> /login shows a "Create administrator account" page (username + password)
2. User picks credentials -> POST /api/auth/setup creates the forced-admin account (scrypt-hashed, stored under the ${password}_USERS credential ref, default DSH_LOGIN_PASSWORD_USERS) and logs it in
3. Subsequent visits -> /login shows the normal username/password login form
4. User management -> admins open 设置 → 用户管理 in the GUI to list (last login/online status), create, disable/enable, remove users and reset passwords (/api/auth/admin/* JSON routes; removing the last admin is refused)
5. Security -> /api/auth/setup returns 403 once any user exists, preventing hijacking

Migration note: the legacy single-password credential (default ref DSH_LOGIN_PASSWORD) no longer logs anyone in. It stays configured but is unused for authentication — the password config key now only namespaces the user store credential ref (${password}_USERS). Upgrading an existing single-password deployment therefore requires the first visit to bootstrap a fresh administrator account.

How it works

Request -> WebServer
  ├─ /login (exact)            -> dsh-login: setup page (if no users) OR login page
  ├─ /api/auth/setup (exact)  -> dsh-login: POST create admin on first use (403 if users exist)
  ├─ /api/auth/login (exact)  -> dsh-login: POST verify {username,password}, set cookie
  ├─ /api/auth/logout (exact) -> dsh-login: POST revoke session, clear cookie
  ├─ /logout (exact)          -> dsh-login: GET same revocation, redirect to /login
  ├─ /api/auth/me (exact)     -> dsh-login: GET current session identity
  ├─ /api/auth/admin/* (exact) -> dsh-login: admin JSON API (users, password, disable, remove)
  ├─ /api/...                 -> native connection + api-remotes/api-gateway (option A):
  │                             browser-session auth, typert REMOTE dispatch, WS streams
  └─ fallback                 -> dsh-login: auth gateway + static files
                                ├─ no valid cookie -> 302 /login
                                └─ valid cookie   -> serveStatic + connection.authorizeIndex

• Cookie: dsh_session, HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict, Path=/
• Session: 32-byte random token (256-bit) with TTL expiry; sessions carry the username and admin flag and are persisted across restarts (/sessions.json, 0o600), so an in-flight SPA keeps working after a process reload instead of turning every /api call into a 401
• Password storage: scrypt hashes (per-user salt) in the DSH credentials system under ${password}_USERS

Multi-user permission model

• Ordinary users are conversation-only. In option A the native connection/api-gateway owns /api and is agent-keyed. Two layers now enforce the boundary:
  1. Method allow-list on the bridge wall (apiBridgeAuth, always on with the wall): a non-admin POST whose wire endpoint (/api/<endpoint>, dotted like session.create) is not on the USER_ALLOWED allow-list is denied — with quietDenials (default) as a wire-correct forbidden envelope, otherwise a plain 403. GET/SSE/WS pass through to the upstream fence (the wire is POST-only).
  2. REMOTE-layer isolation guard (wrapRemoteGateway, exported from this package), composed over typertGateway via the deployment glue (docs/compose-guard.md): restricts ordinary users to their own sessions plus lineage children (subagents/forks — ownership follows parentSessionId), scoped by the ownership sidecar the wall keeps warm.
  • Response narrowing on the bridge wall: session.list / session.search / workspace.list responses of an ordinary user are filtered down to their owned sessions (workspaces keep only owned sessionIds and drop out when none remain) — defense-in-depth on top of the guard, so other users' sessions are invisible even in list projections. Everything else is off limits:
  • physical allow-list: the user-facing wire surface — a fixed set of session.*, subagent.*, workspace.* (including unarchiveSession/pinSession/unpinSession), goal.*, the sidebar terminal.*, the job.* controller, and the read-only workspaceFiles.*/officeToPdf.* document preview, plus skill.list, host.describe, llm.providers/llm.models and respond; any other wire method is refused (enforced by the bridge wall's method gate for ordinary users; the REMOTE-layer guard denies the same set at the dispatch layer once composed)
  • admin-only domains: credentials.*, settings.*, agentPresets.*, the native plugin manager (pluginManager.* + pluginRegistryProbe.*), and the whole account.* namespace (the single process-wide upstream DeepSeek Platform grant — sign-in/out, profile/wallet projections, rc.2's watchExpiry expiry stream) are forbidden wholesale
  • also forbidden: llm.discoverModels and the privileged host.* directory dialogs (pickDirectory, listDirectory, createDirectory, openPath)
  • workspace-scoped mutations are ownership-guarded by workspaceId: a non-admin may only rename/delete/insertBefore a workspace that holds at least one of their own sessions, and create is confined to their own sandbox (workspaceRoot/<username>) — so they cannot touch other users' workspaces or register a workspace pointing at an arbitrary host directory
  • the physical session.export channel (target in the query string, outside the envelope) is ownership-guarded at the carrier
  • event streams (mux/host WebSocket frames): per-user frame filtering rides the composed REMOTE-layer guard (see its docs for the stream surface it covers); the upgrade itself stays fenced by the upstream Host/Origin + browser-auth fence
• Default user workspace (defaultWorkspace, on by default): non-admin users get a per-user isolated default workspace on first /api access — mkdir their sandbox (workspaceRoot/<username>, default <DSH_HOME>/workspaces/<username>) → register it in the durable workspace registry → attach one session (sessions.create({ workspaceId }), the grouping shape) and record its ownership, so the workspace is immediately visible in the user's workspace.list and ready to use. This solves ordinary users being unable to add a workspace on public/FRP deployments (the frontend flow needs the privileged, non-admin-forbidden host.pickDirectory) without loosening that security boundary. Admins can toggle it live from the 设置 → 用户管理 panel's 默认用户工作空间 switch (persisted to <dataDir>/settings.json, effective immediately, no restart); turning it off does not remove existing workspaces. Provisioning is idempotent (once per user per process) and best-effort (failures never fail the triggering request).
• Remote access compat (remoteWebUiCompat, on by default): accommodates @linxin666/dsh-remote-web-ui unchanged. That popular plugin's /remote device-pairing gate 401s non-loopback (public FRP) desktop traffic — the model dialog, history, composer — independently of dsh-login's /api auth. When this flag is on, dsh-login writes remote-web-ui's enabled:true (which is what actually mounts its host routes; without it the server answers nothing and the client fail-closes onto a dead /remote 405 wall) and requirePairingForLan:false (a live, settings-backed flag re-read per request), so non-loopback traffic rides dsh-login's /api channel gated by the dsh_session cookie instead. It also writes publicBaseUrl from the remoteWebUiPublicBaseUrl config when that is set — required for a public FRP/tunnel host so remote-web-ui's Host-header-based /api/pair/* fence trusts the ordinary-user origin (otherwise the browser there gets 403 on /api/pair/status and the client still fail-closes onto /remote). No-op when remote-web-ui is not installed; admins toggle it live from the 设置 → 用户管理 panel's 远程访问兼容 switch (persisted, effective immediately). Note: with remoteWebUiCompat defaulting to on, the pairing barrier is off for every dsh-login + remote-web-ui deployment — intended, since dsh-login's own /api auth still sits in front.
• Capability discovery + quiet denials (quietDenials, on by default): stops the browser-splashing "forbidden" walls that installed UI plugins (task-board, plugin-manager, agentPreset, doctor, …) trigger on an ordinary-user session when they probe /api/* they cannot use. Three layers: (1) GET /api/auth/capabilities returns the authenticated identity's method/domain/UI-plugin surface (ordinary = the USER_ALLOWED allow-list + core plugins; admin = everything), and dsh-login injects a static non-admin baseline into window.__DSH_SESSION__ at index-render time so clients that read it render no unauthorized feature instead of probing; (2) on the /api bridge wall, a denied non-admin POST is answered with a wire-correct server-response envelope carrying { ok: false, code: 'forbidden' } (HTTP 200) — the wall consumes the request body to echo the caller's rpcId, so the browser surfaces an ordinary denied-RPC error instead of a transport-failure splash; (3) with quietDenials off, denied POSTs fall back to a plain 403. Authorization is never loosened — only the shape of the denial is quieter. Admins can flip quietDenials off to restore plain 403 everywhere.
• /api bridge auth wall (apiBridgeAuth, on by default; DSH ≥ 0.1.6-alpha.2): on the upstream connection/request hook dsh-login answers 401 for any bridged /api request without a live dsh_session — so logout/expiry/revocation actually cut /api access even though the browser keeps the connection row's process-wide browser-auth cookie. Beyond authentication, the wall is the per-user enforcement seam: the method allow-list gate (above) and the response narrowing for session.list/session.search/workspace.list ride the same hook, and admitted session.create/session.fork/workspace.create responses are observed to keep the ownership sidecar warm (admin-created resources are recorded too, record-only, so the composed REMOTE-layer guard can attribute admin sessions). Plugin-exact routes (/api/auth/*, remote-web-ui's /api/pair/* pairing) never touch the bridge and keep working pre-login; the stream-mux WebSocket upgrade stays fenced by the upstream Host/Origin + browser-auth fence (no per-request hook exists there). Turn it off only if you serve the bridge to clients that cannot carry the dsh_session cookie — e.g. remote-web-ui's /remote paired-device channel re-issues requests server-side without it (pairing is by design a full-control credential outside dsh-login's user model). On DSH < 0.1.6-alpha.2 the hook does not exist and this is a harmless no-op.
• Admin sees and does everything: unfiltered API access, all sessions/workspaces visible, and the 设置 → 用户管理 settings section.
• Logout: the settings panel's 用户管理/账户 section carries a logout entry for every user (POST /api/auth/logout → /login); GET /logout works as a plain link.
• Admin user management (设置 → 用户管理): ships inside the GUI settings panel via the browser bundle — no separate page. Inside it, the Allowed Hosts / Trusted Hosts card lists the /api whitelist (learned + manually added) with add/remove — removing takes effect immediately. A 默认用户工作空间 switch toggles the per-user default-workspace provisioning live (persisted, no restart), and a 远程访问兼容 switch toggles the remote-web-ui requirePairingForLan bypass. The user list reports each account's last-login time (stamped on every successful login; never before its first login after the feature shipped), online session count, and disabled flag; per-row actions reset passwords, disable/enable, and remove users (single non-wrapping line, right-aligned). Ordinary users get an 账户 section (identity + logout). The panel styles itself entirely through the framework's --dsw-alias-* theme tokens, so it follows the app skin (light/dark) automatically.

Data locations

Data	Location
User accounts (scrypt hashes)	DSH credentials system, ref ${password}_USERS (default DSH_LOGIN_PASSWORD_USERS)
Session→user ownership sidecar	<DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/ownership.json (configurable via dataDir; DSH_HOME env or ~/.dsh)
Auto-learned / admin Host whitelist	<DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/trusted-hosts.json (configurable via dataDir)
Default-user-workspace toggle	<DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/settings.json (configurable via dataDir)
Remote-web-ui compat toggle	<DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/settings-remote-web-ui.json (configurable via dataDir)
Login sessions	<DSH_HOME>/.dsh-login/sessions.json (0o600; persisted across restarts, TTL drops stale)

/api integration (option A, DSH ≥ 0.1.5-alpha.1)

For DSH ≥ 0.1.5-alpha.1 dsh-login no longer takes over the /api carrier: cordis.patch.yml leaves the shipped connection row enabled, so dsh-client-connection + api-remotes / api-gateway own the /api transport and the live Remote streams. dsh-login composes its per-user layer on top of that native stack (see docs/adapt-dsh-0.1.5.md and the verification checklist docs/verify-option-A.md): fallback login wall + static serving through the native serveStatic, plus connection.authorizeIndex on index responses so the browser receives its upstream /api cookie. The old src/connection.ts carrier takeover and its dist/client.js re-stamp were removed with the dsh-host-apiproxy-based per-user ApiProxy. The per-user conversation / workspace isolation is re-homed as a REMOTE-layer guard — wrapRemoteGateway + createRemoteIsolation, exported from this package's host bundle and unit/integration-tested — which a deployment composes over the native typertGateway at boot using the shipped glue (dsh-login publishes its ownership sidecar as the dshLoginOwnership service; composeDshLoginGuard / docs/compose-guard.md). The two-browser behavioral sign-off of that composition is the remaining, boot-bound step (see docs/verify-option-A.md §B).

Host trust is evaluated live per request. The /api fence uses a deduped effective set — LAN literals from the web runtime + trustedHosts + the persisted whitelist (src/hosts.ts). A successful login/setup auto-learns the request Host (gated by autoTrustHosts, default true), so a public host reached through frp/隧道/tunnels is trusted after one login; learned hosts bind immediately and removals apply without a restart.

Security notes

Protected by the gateway

Asset	Protection
Page navigation (/)	302 redirect to /login if unauthenticated
Static assets (/assets/*.js, .css, etc.)	Same gateway check
SPA routes (/conversations, /settings, etc.)	Same gateway check

Protected by the bridge wall

Asset	Protection
API requests (/api/*)	isTrustedApiRequest host trust and a valid dsh_session cookie (401 without one); non-allowed POST methods denied for ordinary users (wire-correct forbidden envelope with quietDenials, else 403); session.list/session.search/workspace.list responses narrowed to owned sessions
WebSocket (/api/events.mux, /api/events.host)	Host-trust + browser-auth checks on upgrade (upstream fence — no per-request hook exists there); per-user frame filtering is provided by the composed REMOTE-layer guard, not the upgrade fence

Recommendations for public exposure

1. With autoTrustHosts on (default), any successful login learns its Host into the whitelist (/api/auth/admin/hosts, manageable in 设置 → 用户管理), so an frp/tunnel host is trusted after one login — no trustedHosts editing needed. Keep it on unless you want only loopback + an explicit trustedHosts set to be accepted.
2. Use a reverse proxy (nginx/caddy) with TLS termination in front of DSH.
3. The gateway cookie is SameSite=Strict, protecting against CSRF on the login/logout endpoints.

Troubleshooting: a non-admin user "cannot add a workspace" over a public tunnel?

Diagnosis quick reference: this is almost never the host whitelist (autoTrustHosts already learns the public host and login succeeds). The real blocker is that ordinary users are denied the privileged directory picker host.pickDirectory by design (api-filter.ts deliberately 403s it for non-admin users, together with listDirectory/createDirectory/openPath). The frontend's add-workspace flow must call pickDirectory to choose a host directory, so non-admins get stuck — e.g. transport failure for /api/host.pickDirectory: HTTP 403.

• This is isolation-by-design, not a broken deployment. Do not "fix" it by allowing host.pickDirectory for ordinary users (that would let them browse/choose arbitrary host directories and break multi-user isolation).
• The correct fix is this plugin's default user workspace (defaultWorkspace, on by default): a non-admin's first /api access auto-provisions a per-username-isolated sandbox workspace (with a starter session, immediately visible in workspace.list and usable), entirely bypassing the blocked picker. Admins toggle it live from the 设置 → 用户管理 panel's 默认用户工作空间 switch.
• If autoTrustHosts is on, public login works, yet /api still 403s, it is almost certainly this pickDirectory method-level permission rather than the trust fence.

Architecture note: fallback vs prefix /

The gateway uses registerFallback() (not register({ kind: 'prefix', path: '/' })) because the DSH WebServer's prefix matching checks pathname.startsWith(prefix + '/'). For prefix /, this becomes //, which no normal path starts with -- a prefix / route only matches the exact path /. The fallback handler catches everything no named route claims, which is the correct catch-all behavior for the authentication gateway.

The WebServer has a single fallback seat. dsh-web-app's web-runtime row mounts frontend-static over it unconditionally, so the web-runtime row must be disabled when using dsh-login; dsh-login re-provides the webRuntime service that row owned (LAN trust, DSH_WEB_URL), leaving the rest of the composition intact.

Running tests

# Canonical full suite (247 tests, green under option A against DSH 0.1.5-alpha.1 through 0.2.1-alpha.2; requires the DSH checkout for package
# resolution — set DSH_HARNESS_CHECKOUT or run beside the default path)
npx vitest run

The .spec.ts files are the canonical vitest definitions, including the pure/multi-user-adjacent suites (users, ownership, hosts, admin-api, session, gateway, capabilities, remote-web-ui-compat, client-bundle, settings-panel, plugin-entry, bridge-list-filter, …). The connection / api-filter / multiuser-e2e specs were removed in the option-A adaptation (they tested the deleted dsh-host-apiproxy /api takeover); the REMOTE-layer isolation guard is covered by tests/remote-guard.spec.ts (ownership scoping, admin passthrough, array/nested id-arg ownership) and the bridge wall (401 + method gate + quiet denials + record/filter tee + provisioning trigger) by tests/api-bridge-auth.spec.ts. tests/runner.mjs and tests/integration-runner.mjs are sandbox-compatible harnesses for the original single-password core only; they were not extended for the multi-user feature. The live two-browser isolation sign-off (§B of docs/verify-option-A.md) still requires a booted deployment.

Project structure

src/
├── index.ts          # Cordis plugin entry: registers auth routes, fallback login gateway, webRuntime
├── config.ts         # schemastery config schema (password, distIndex, dataDir, sessionTtl, ...)
├── users.ts          # UserStore: user records, scrypt hashing, credentials-backed persistence
├── session.ts        # SessionStore: sessions (user + admin flag) with TTL expiry, persisted across restarts
├── ownership.ts      # OwnershipIndex: sessionId → username sidecar (debounced JSON file)
├── hosts.ts          # TrustedHosts: trusted-host whitelist (live set + debounced JSON persistence)
├── api-filter.ts     # pure predicates (AuthUser/USER_ALLOWED/isUserAllowed) for the per-user admission seam
├── bridge-list-filter.ts  # wire-response observation: owned-session closure + session/workspace.list narrowing (used by the bridge wall)
├── host-session-access.ts  # lazy host-side session surface (sessionController first, typertGateway fallback) for provisioning/list-probe
├── provision.ts      # DefaultWorkspaceProvisioner: per-user sandbox + registry workspace + seeded attached session
├── glue.ts           # deployment-side composition glue (dshLoginOwnership service + composeDshLoginGuard), see docs/compose-guard.md
├── settings-panel.client.js  # settings-panel browser half (plain JS): 用户管理/账户 section, theme-token styled
├── workspace-setting.ts  # 默认用户工作空间 runtime toggle (extends BooleanSetting)
├── boolean-setting.ts  # live + persisted {enabled} runtime flag shared by admin switches
├── remote-web-ui-compat.ts  # writes remote-web-ui's enabled+requirePairingForLan+publicBaseUrl (settings-backed, live) to mount its routes & bypass pairing / trust the public host
├── capabilities.ts  # capability discovery (deriveCapabilities) + read-probe classifier (isReadProbe/QUIET_DENY_METHODS)
├── admin-api.ts      # /api/auth/me + /api/auth/capabilities + /api/auth/admin/* JSON routes (settings-panel backend)
├── auth.ts           # Cookie management + constant-time compare helpers
├── gateway.ts        # Auth gateway fallback (login wall + serveStatic + upstream connection.authorizeIndex)
├── login-api.ts      # POST /api/auth/login + logout + setup
├── login-page.ts     # Login and setup page HTML
├── http-json.ts      # readBody/sendJson helpers + resolveDshHome
├── remote-guard.ts   # REMOTE-layer per-user isolation guard (wrapRemoteGateway + createRemoteIsolation), exported from the host bundle
└── web-runtime.ts    # webRuntime takeover: LAN trust + DSH_WEB_URL
tests/ (option-A suite: 19 files / 247 tests green)
└── *.spec.ts         # vitest test definitions

License

MIT